biography:
I'm a cybernetic organism: living tissue over a metal endoskeleton. My C.P.U. is a neural-net processor--a learning computer.
currently reading:
My neighbours mail.
currently watching:
my mouth.
currently listening to:
The voices in your head.
Dropkick Murphys
Misfits
The Specials
NOFX
Pennywise
The Killers
The Get Up Kids
DMX
Jedi Mind Tricks
Arcade Fire
Rancid
Johnny Cash
Stray Cats
Carl Perkins
many others…
Summary: This paper will deal specifically with those issues which make the geostrategic role of the Middle East important to the United States, and demonstrate that American interventionism in the Middle East has been motivated by three important interlinking factors; containing the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War; securing both control and access to oil reserves; and Israels security who over the years developed a special relationship with the United States; all of which fall under the category of U.S. interests ” (Lesch 415)
Scholars of international relations approach contemporary issues using two formal methods. The first method is a descriptive approach which focuses on attempting to understand the immediate sequences of events that lead to a particular outcome. So for example, one could say, that in retaliation to members of a terrorist network who flew jet airliners into the World Trade Centers, and the Pentagon on September 11th 2001, the United States military is now engaged in a war in Iraq, and Afghanistan in an attempt to combat terrorism. The other approach is used when trying to understand long-term, more indirect causes that lead to a particular consequence (Goldstein and Pevehouse 98) This approach forces scholars, and researchers alike to engage in a theoretical historical analysis in order to better understand, for instance, why terrorists attacked the United States, and furthermore, why the U.S. attacked Saddam Husseins regime when all of the hijackers, and terrorist planners had no association with Iraqi leadership (Pincus, and Milbank A01). The reason for the United States attacking Iraq, and seeking regime change can be descriptively connected to a document produced by the American Enterprise Institute – a neo-conservative think tank comprised of key influential members of the Bush administration such as Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and so forth. The document entitled, Rebuilding Americas Defenses aimed to devise a strategy for American military power in the era since the end of the Cold War (Smith 164). The strategy seeks regime change in a number of countries such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and North Korea. Using a more theoretical approach it becomes evident that American interventionism, namely in the Middle East, has been the result of a series of complex issues that have been at the heart of American foreign policy since the beginning of the 19th century.
This paper will deal specifically with those issues which make the geostrategic role of the Middle East important to the United States, and demonstrate that American interventionism in the Middle East has been motivated by three important interlinking factors; containing the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War; securing both control and access to oil reserves; and Israels security who over the years developed a special relationship with the United States; all of which fall under the category of U.S. interests (Lesch 415).
The strategic importance of oil was first realized at the beginning of the 19th century by the British, and later underscored during World War I where oil was used not only to power naval fleets, but also new instruments of warfare like planes, tanks, and Lorries (Shaffer 43). Winston Churchill acknowledged the importance of oil mainly because Britain had none, but also because it was well understood that relying on other countries to supply crucial resources during wartime created a dependence that could pose enormous threats to security. In a speech to parliament Churchill once stated,
We must become the owners, or at any rate the controllers at the source, of at least a proportion of the supply or natural oil which we require and obtain our oil supply, so far as possible, from sources under British control, or British influence (Shaffer 42)
Around the same time French President Clemenceau was noting to President Wilson that oil was, in fact, as necessary as blood, and he was later echoed by his oil commissioner, M. Victor Henry Brenger who in 1919 said, he who has oil has Empire! (De La Tramerye 10). The United States was certainly not late in realizing this importance, however. It should be noted, that the United States supplied most of the needed reserves to the Allied forces of World War I, and during the Second World War, supplied 5 billion of the 7 billion barrels consumed between 1941 and 1945 (Shaffer 75).
Lack of oil during the Second World War proved to be exactly the type of strategic necessity Churchill noted in 1919. For the Third Reich, the need for oil was matter of critical importance since Germany only produced about a half million tons when she needed nearly four times that during wartime (Dziewanowski 77). As such many key battles were fought over oil. The drive to Stalingrad, for example, was partly motivated by the Germans desire to cut off oil supplies to the Red Army. Germanys conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia was also to help to secure petroleum reserves for the Third Reich. Japans invasion of Indonesia was likewise motivated by the need to secure oil. Even the Allies understood oils strategic importance, and attempted to deprive the Germans of its major sources during the massive air raids on Ploesti in Rumania. These are but a few examples of oils strategic importance during war (Shaffer 75).
With an enormous dependence on oil, however, there arises one consistent theme in its history: the fear of depletion. Although the U.S. feared oil depletion during World War I, it was feared even more-so during the second World War when in 1943 William Bullitt, Under Secretary of the Navy, drafted a letter to President Roosevelt stating:
The crude petroleum reserves of the United States, at either present rates of withdrawal or peace-time rates, will be totally exhausted in about 14 years unless new reserves of major importance should be discovered (Shaffer 75).
It is this depletion factor that causes oil companies to be remorselessly driven by what is sometimes called the territorial imperative. Oil companies must be continuously on the move in search of new oil-rich regions (Rutledge 4). The concern was assessed, and then reiterated that same year by the Petroleum Industry War Council who issued a statement saying,
The national policy of the United States should aim at securing for American nationals access to the worlds oil reserves (Rutledge 20).
The quote is extremely telling as it demonstrates the shift in policy to the symbiotic relationship, then in it early stages, between oil executives, and state officials. The quote, however, can be somewhat misleading as it suggests the United States was maintaining isolationist policies when in actuality the United States was actively pursuing an expansionist role as early as 1901 attempting to secure the oil rich regions of Mexico.
Initially control over Mexico turned into a corporate battle between Britain and the United States. Following the bitter entanglements, the United States gained the upper-hand after financing the overthrow of Mexican president Victoriano Huerta, and on the eve of World War I replaced him with Venustian Carranza. The United States had good reason to favour Carranza as he openly endorsed foreign control over its reserves while his predecessor preferred a state controlled industry on the premise that national interests yield private benefit. By 1919 Mexico represented 16% of the worlds oil production then considered second largest behind the United States (Shaffer 47). The stay was short lived, however, and after oil companies were essentially thrown out of Mexico for failing to address worker conditions, oil executives were forced to search elsewhere. It wouldnt be before long that most of the oil headed to the Allied forces during World War II would be receiving their reserves from Venezuela. Despite its closer proximity, prospects in the Middle Eastern were only just beginning to come into focus – it wasnt until 1944 that its full oil potential was realized. Nevertheless, with the looming threat of nationalization that had already hit Mexico in 1938 and the fear that Venezuelan oil might soon to run out, oil executives headed to the Middle East in hopes of cashing in on the emerging wealth.
As the search for oil in the Middle East gained increasing momentum, the end of the Second World War gave rise to two new very important issues that would become the center of preoccupation throughout almost every presidential administration to this very day. The first preoccupation was in regard to the Soviet expansion along Russias southern flank (Little 120). The second is Israel which will be addressed later (Little 23).
Under the Truman doctrine Washington originally sought to assume only a secondary role in the Middle East next to Britain who shared the same enthusiasm for the prevention of the Soviet expansion. Washington was to handle the Western bastions of the Middle East, such as Greece and Turkey, while the British were to maintain control of the Persian Gulf oil fields, and the Suez Canal which were considered primary interest[s] (Little 124). Not long after, however, it became clear to state department officials that the British were no longer able to keep the Middle East in order without the help of the United States (Little 120). Notwithstanding Britains bleak future the Anglo-American partnership carried on according to plan.
With Greece and Turkey under relatively good control [American] the focus quickly became Iran. Iran is a strategic necessity not only because of its vast amount of oil, but also in part due its close proximity to the Persian Gulf. Scholars argue that in hindsight it appears the Soviet Expansion into Iran was most likely about securing itself with access to oil rather than exerting direct or indirect influence over the existing government. Nevertheless, Washington interpreted Stalins late withdrawal from Iran as a gross violation of Iranian sovereignty which held many dangerous implications. Washington, then, attempted to strong arm the Kremlin with U.N. resolutions, and covert threats, but in actuality these tactics proved much less effective than the diplomatic intervention of Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam who would convince the Kremlin to withdraw their troops in exchange for guaranteed access to oil (Little 121). Even still, with Irans enormous oil resources, and close proximity to Israel, Soviet encroachment left a bad taste in Washingtons mouth.
By the 1950s Britains foothold on places like Iran, and Egypt were slipping dramatically. Eager to save face and get out, Washington stood ready to fill in the void. With Truman no longer in office, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and secretary of state John Foster Dulles took a more hard-line approach to the Mid-East crisis beginning with Iran. Concerned that the rising instability in Iran might provide the Soviets with good reason to advance on the situation at a time when the United States was ill-prepared to defend the region, Eisenhower, borrowing the plan from the British, devised a strategy to turn the tide in favour of the U.S. The plan was to overthrow the democratic leader Muhammed Mossadegh. Mossadegh governed by popular rule, and was driven by two central philosophies; a passionate faith in the rule of law, which made him an enemy of the autocracy; and the belief that Iranians must rule themselves, and not submit to the will of foreigners (Dankof). This also meant nationalization of the oil industry. Unlike Truman who expressed outrage at Stalins late withdrawal, calling it a gross violation to the integrity, and sovereignty of the Iranian people, Einsenhowers administration took a less favourable approach to self-determination when it came to issues of U.S. interests.
In 1953 Eisenhower appointed the grandson of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Kermit, and the C.I.A. to initiate Operation Ajax (Goode 109), a black-ops project, which consisted of four lines of attack; a C.I.A. orchestrated press and media campaign against Mossadegh; staging political protests leading to mob control over the streets; bribing key military, and police forces who were sympathetic to the royalists; and the subversion, and suborning of parliament (Dankof). The operation was eventually a success, and led to the overthrow of Mossadegh who was arrested, and succeeded by the shah General Zahedi a brutal dictator. The shah used his police forces to crush opposition with savage violence, and jailed pro-Mossadegh supporters that took to the streets. It was a grim moment in Iranian history that would pave the road to extreme Western resentment still visible today.
While it is generally agreed upon by both critics, and defenders alike that the coup in Iran was an extension of Cold War strategies, it was also extremely effective at breaking the oil monopoly Britain maintained (Shaffer 104). As a result, the British had to give up sixty percent of its former Persian Gulf oil business, forty percent of which went a consortium of U.S. corporations, while Kermit Roosevelt received a Vice President position in Gulf Oil a major U.S. oil company (Rutledge 34).
By the time the Kennedy administration reached office, British colonialism had evoked enormous resentment among Egyptians. So much so that pro-Arab nationalism was beginning to spread throughout other regions like Iraq, and Jordan. In Egypt, distain for British imposed influence over the Suez canal a strategic trade route grew to such volatile conditions that it became apparent Britain would be forced to leave the region for good. Both London, and Washington saw this inevitability, and Kennedy pressed his administration to come up with a solution. The hope was that either Saudi Arabia or the shah would fill the role as regional police officers. The preferential Arab solution showed signs of progress as Britain began to withdraw from the Persian Gulf; Saudi Arabia moved to place hundreds of troops in Kuwait at the disposal of the Kuwaiti government who stood atop of large oil reserves (Little 137).
As the personality of the House of Saud became clear, however, Washington felt placing entire security of the region in corrupt hands was an invitation to disaster. Furthermore Saudi forces were not much of a deterrent, and the fickleness of its leader projected a bad image in Washington (Little 138).
In Iran, political and economic conditions did not differ drastically from that of Saudi Arabia rendering both countries susceptible to internal uprisings, and therefore unable to produce stable military security. Moreover, it is to the benefit of oil companies that the region maintains, at least, some peace because when it comes to security, corporations remorselessly driven by profit do not particularly enjoy footing the bill. Nevertheless Iran remained a key ally in the region by proving eager to play a role in regional defense in preventing Soviet expansion into a region containing two-thirds of the worlds oil. As Britain continually moved south, and into the India Ocean, the shah assured Washington of its prior commitment, and in turn JFK sent a massive shipment of arms under the Military Assistance Program.
Succeeding Kennedy was his vice President Lyndon Johnson who, by 1966, adopted the two pillar strategy for the Middle East calling for Saudi Arabia, and Iran to assume the role of Britains responsibility for defending the region (Little 140)
Saudis, having agreed to assume their Western defensive position, were then granted $100 million in military hardware. Saudi enthusiasm, however, was dwarfed in comparison to the shah who dreamed of combining his nations fabulous oil wealth with high-tech U.S. weaponry. With the military involvement in Vietnam rapidly escalating beefing up the shahs arsenal (Little 141) was seen to be the most cost-effective approach. But it wouldnt be until 1968 that Richard Nixon would give the new strategic Doctrine its name. Hoping to reduce the risk of involvement relying on pro-Western proxies both armed and bankrolled by the United States, Washington moved ahead with arming both countries (Little 143).
Saudi Arabia spent little time waiting, however, and immediately began to double its defense spending from $700 million to $1.4 billion (Little 144). Using its oil revenues to pay for defense requirements, the Saudis were also applying diplomatic pressure to their South East neighbours 6 former British controlled sheikdoms in order to establish a pro-Western federation called the United Emirates.
On the other side of the Persian Gulf the shah was busy outlining a plan for U.S. officials to start using Irans petrodollars in order to finance a military buildup that would dwarf Saudi efforts under way. Determined to see his country emerge in a position of power, and leadership that would effectively take over where the British left off, the shah presented his strategy which coincidentally mirrored that of Washingtons desire to shift the cost of regional defense from the American taxpayer to stable and well armed proxies (Little 144). Nixon, and his national security advisor, Henry Kissenger were presumably very relieved to know Iran was willing to play the role of a regional defense proxy, especially considering the situation in Vietnam which made any mass deployment of troops on the American part totally unfeasible. In return the shah was granted more state of the art military equipment including F-14 and F-15 supersonic jets. They were minuscule grants though in comparison to the shahs shopping list which asked for more planes, tanks, warships, and laser-guided missiles amounting to approximately seven times what he had spent during the preceding two decades (Little 145). While it is true the two previous administrations saw enormous instability throughout the region, by the end of Nixons time in office, U.S. interests in the Middle East were relatively secure from a Soviet expansion, and American companies were ensured secure access to two-thirds of the worlds oil supply.
Although the following president was a democrat, Jimmy Carter made no attempt to distance himself from the policies of Nixon. Instead the Carter administration moved to enforce a Doctrine encouraging Iran to become a regional power assuming limited security responsibilities (Little 147). As such the twin pillar design proved extremely effective in replacing the role Britain played shielding the crucial oil rich region of the Persian Gulf from possible Soviet intrusion in the thirty years prior (Little 148).
Problems began to arise, however, in 1979 as the Islamic revolt against the shahs repressive control gained increasing momentum, and Iranian students held fifty-two Americans hostage in Tehran. Coupled with OPECs 1973 decision to limit production which sent oil prices skyrocketing (Goldstein and Pevehouse 98), Washington was suddenly asking itself whether or not Iran could still be relied upon to play its regional role. To make matters worse Afghan communists, backed by Kremlin commandos, seized power in Kabul in a violent coup, and installed a pro-Soviet regime. Although Russian archives remain murky, evidence thus far suggest that Moscows military intervention in Kabul was probably a defensive maneuver and not a first step in a Kremlin master plan to drive the U.S. out of the Persian Gulf (Little 150). Moscow feared Irans Islamic revolution might start spreading to other nations along the Russias Southern border (Little 151).
From Washingtons perspective, however, things looked very different. Carters national security advisor Zbigniew Brezezinski moved in quickly to inform that the age-long dream of Moscow having direct access to the Indian Ocean will be accomplished if the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan (Little 151). Carter, having acknowledged that the region is of great strategic importance because it contains more than two-thirds of the worlds exportable oil, imposed an embargo on grain exports to Russia, and to create a Rapid Deployment Force able to dispatch troops to the Persian Gulf at a moments notice (Little 151).
As such, on April 6th 1979, Carters administration instructed the C.I.A. to initiate a covert war in Afghanistan. With the help from the Pakistani intelligence, the C.I.A. began funding, and providing weapons such as stinger antiaircraft missiles to the Mujahadeen Muslim rebels – who were led by a young engineer named Osama Bin Laden. Between Washington and Saudi Arabia, the Mujahadeen received approximately $6 billion in aid. The strategy was to keep maximum pressure on the Kremlin for its withdrawal, and to ensure high costs for its endeavor while the occupation continued. However, it wasnt long before the Kremlin, and their Afghan clients realized they were fighting a losing battle. With Ronald Reagan in office consistently increasing both the cost on Moscow, and support for the Mujahadeen, the Soviets by 1989, decided to cut their losses, and withdraw. Destabilizing the Evil Empire under the National Security Decision Directive 75 became the centerpiece for what has come to be known as the Reagan Doctrine (Little 153). The strategy was extremely effective is accelerating the Soviet Unions collapse, and by 1992 the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan had fully disintegrated. Pushing the Kremlin out of Afghanistan was a great strategic success for the United States as it prevented Moscows age-long dream from being achieved, and in turn denying deep penetration between Iran, and Pakistan which would have posed a threat to the oil rich fields of the Persian Gulf (Little 151).
Succeeding Reagan was George Bush Sr. who would follow the same strategies of the Carter Doctrine in defending the Persian Gulf. This was illustrated during the 1990 Gulf War when long-time business partner of the United States, Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait after a political dispute regarding repayment of loans during the Iran-Iraq war turned ugly. During Clintons tenure, a policy of dual containment was directed at Iraq and Iran now both considered rogue states. Washington wasted no time in identifying these states as the most likely to succeed Moscow as the chief threat to U.S. interests in the region (Little 155). The policy of dual containment might have carried had it not been for the attacks on September 11th and as such the new administration lead by George W. Bush, sought to create its own National Security Strategy. The strategy outlined in 2002 was to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States (Bush 30). The strategy in combination with the goal of Rebuilding Americas Defenses as discussed earlier, seeks to remove leaders of rogue states who sit atop areas of great strategic importance, and to replace them with, presumably, pro-Western governments. But in the midst of trying to maintain strategic control over U.S. interests in the Middle East there resides another factor that has continuously encouraged U.S. endeavors within the region. That reason is Israel, and in order to fully understand this special relationship, one must analyze the events surrounding Israels birth.
Origins of a Zionist movement committed to accelerating Jewish immigration to Palestine can be dated back to 1897 when the first Zionist organization was established (Little 15). Originally the majority of support for a Jewish state came from London though it wasnt until 1917 when foreign secretary Arthur Belfur chose to formally endorse the idea paving the way for what came to be known as the Belfur Declaration (Little 16). Washington concurred in the formula suggested from the other side, but sought instead to limit its entanglements abroad. It wasnt until the end of World War II when the Middle East became a strategic priority that the U.S. decided the declaration deserved closer attention. By then, however, six million Jews had already been murdered during Hitlers reign of terror. U.S. noninvolvement prior to the war evoked tremendous feelings of guilt, and it would be this very guilt that would plague future administrations to come.
Thinking the U.S. could have done more to prevent the holocaust created enormous sympathy within Washington which would become the basis for this special relationship. As such, and despite Palestinian protests, on May 15th, 1948 under the command of President Truman, the Jewish state of Israel was formed. Beginning with an immigration program which sought to place 250,000 Jews inside Palestine (little 23), the birth of the two-state settlement one Jew, one Arab was established. The relationship hasnt always been pleasant though, and at times it was hard for Washington to distinguish whether Israel was a strategic asset or a political liability. This was especially true during the Eisenhower administration when $40 million in aid was frozen after Israel refused to stop an irrigation project in the no-mans-land separating Syria and Israel (Little 89). However, there were other times when Israel proved to be the exact strategic ally needed. When the Kremlin perceived the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam as a sign of weakness, for example, and began arming Egypt and Syria, Israels military was able to deter Soviet influence. The basis for this special relationship should serve in part as an explanation why the United States has been so adamant in arming the Israeli military. The relationship has changed little since 1948, and in many respects, Israel plays the strategic role of a regional defense force.
The conclusion is that the United States attempts to use stable proxy forces as regional defense armies in order to defend an area of great strategic importance because the it contains more than two-thirds of the worlds exportable oil. Control over oil continues to be an important strategic asset as it allows one a functioning military whilst maintaining the capability to deny adversaries their source of energy. It has been nearly one hundred years since Frances oil commissioner proclaimed, he who has oil has Empire! and still today that message is true. The consortium of companies who supply the oil are remorselessly driven by a territorial imperative, and therefore must continuously be on the move in search of new oil rich areas. This in turn forms a symbiotic relationship between oil executives, and foreign policy planners. Neither one necessarily motivates the other since both are driven by their own individual requirements.
Overall the strategies employed over the past seventy years have served, at best, as temporary solutions. Kremlin forces were pushed back in Afghanistan, but, in turn, the United States neglected the appeal of revolutionary nationalism, and radical Islam. United States involvement in propping up puppet regimes that put down dissenters with savage efficiency were effective in keeping the party line, but also in spawning a wave of anti-Western resentment. However, it wouldnt be until the C.I.A.s protg Osama Bin Laden shocked the world on September 11th that this long-standing resentment was fully realized. Today much of that resentment is coupled with the invasion of Iraq, and the United States special relationship with Israel which continues its occupation of Palestine. Nevertheless, the Middle East still maintains its geostrategic importance, and it is unlikely the United States will forgo the responsibility of attempting to secure the region.
Bibliography
Bush, George. The White House. National Security Strategy. Washington: U.S., 2002.
Dankof, Mark. “George Bush, Iran, and the Ghost of Kermit Roosevelt and Operation Ajax Al-Bawaba News 31 Dec. (2003): 1-3. Factiva. Concordia University Libraries. 28 Mar. 2007 .
de la Tramerye, Ernest L’Espagnol, Pierre Paul, and Leese, Leonard, Charles The World-Struggle For Oil. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1924.
Dziewanowski, M.K. War At Any Price: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945 2nd Edition. Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey, 1991.
Goldstein, S. Joshua, and Pevehouse, C. Jon. International Relations. Montreal: Pearson Longman, 2007.
Goode, F. James. The United States and Iran, 1946-51: the diplomacy of neglect. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989.
Lesch, W. David. The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press; 1996.
Little, Douglas. American Orientalism : the United States and the Middle East since 1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
Pincus, Dana Milbank, “Al Qaeda-Hussein Link is Dismissed.” Washington Post 17 June. 2004: A01. Factiva. Concordia University Libraries. 23. Apr. 2007 .
Rutledge, Ian. Addicted to oil: America’s elentless drive for energy security. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Shaffer, Ed. The United States and the Control of World Oil. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983.
Smith, Phillip. Why War? The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez. Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 2005
Sign up for the GNN newsletter (Related) Sign up for the GNN newsletter to get the first word on video premieres and breaking news.
Read the GNN FAQ (Related) Read the GNN FAQ for information about the site, forum rules and other GNN 2.0 information.
Optimized for FireFox (Related) Optimized for FireFox
To download the Firefox web browser, visit mozilla.com (Related)
I admit a lot is left out especially in regard to Israel, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Egypt is really important because the problem between Nasser and Gurion is what sparked the surge of pro-Arab nationalism. If you have anything you want to add please feel free to do so. Any corrections to my history are also welcome, but just don’t be a dick about it. :p
This paper should (hopefully) give people an honest perspective on US involvement in the over the last 70 years. I tried to be fair to the United States – using cynicism only when appropriate.